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Abstract. Historians, like all social scientists, must make assumptions about how the 
brain works. This essay suggests how some of the recent findings of the brain sciences 
might enhance our ability to understand or describe patterns or processes in the past. A 
key feature of the brain and nervous system is that they are open to developmental and 
epigenetic influences, meaning that cultural patterns can shape or influence brain 
structures, at least in the aggregate population. This essay sets out the theoretical basis for 
a neuroscientific approach to the past, and develops a case study based on the 
neurobiology of stress. 
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History and neuroscience make strange bedfellows. The past cannot easily offer 
neuroscientists a set of hypotheses or research questions to be tested via brain imaging 
experiments. Historians, in turn, have been disinclined to deal with behavioral or 
psychological patterns that have the appearance of being universal or hard-wired, since 
the realm of the universal offers little traction for arguments about historical change. In 
addition, there are problems of relevance, for on what grounds can we legitimately 
borrow the findings of a science based largely on the study of sea slugs and mice and the 
like and project those findings willy-nilly onto the human past? Finally, neuroscience 
may have something to offer fields that focus on the present day: what goes on in the 
nervous systems of people who are shopping or dancing or engaging in devotional  
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exercises, for example, or whether music contributes to healing
1. But how can any study 
of the brain and the nervous system be drawn into explanations about how and why 
things have changed, the question at the heart of the historical enterprise? 
In this paper, I hope to offer an architecture of historical understanding that may 
allow us to bring aspects of neuroscience into conversations we have about change in the 
human past. Much of this architecture comes from environmental history, a field that 
explores human history in relationship to the environment we inhabit. The key feature of 
this field is that environmental history does not treat either humans or the environment as 
the sovereign partner in the relationship; the model does not assume a simple Aristotelian 
pattern of cause-and-effect, where influence flows from a prime mover toward an object 
that is moved.
2 Instead, the patterns of influence are cross-cutting, mutual, and 
contingent. In his study of the German landscape from the age of Frederic the Great to 
the twentieth century, for example, the historian David Blackbourn
3 explored how rivers, 
marshes, and coastal zones were diked, drained, dammed, and channeled, and how, in the 
process, a new landscape was created, with unpredictable consequences for the people 
who lived in it. The channeling of rivers, for instance, lowered the water table, and 
agrarian patterns were transformed by the resulting need to rely on irrigation. The 
channeling of rivers also influenced seasonal fish runs. In this changed environment, 
certain cultural patterns and institutions faded away and others emerged in their place. 
Studies like this promote an understanding of the past in which humans and their 
environment are engaged in an ongoing relationship defined by a mutual and reciprocal 
set of influences.  
Environmental history, in short, develops a dialectical model for understanding 
change in the human past. Rather than offering a solipsistic history, as if humanity is the 
                                                 
1 Patel (2008). 
2 The argument of environmental determinism has a long pedigree, extending back at 
least to the nineteenth century in the work of Henry Thomas Buckle (1857-61). The most 
recent version of environmental determinism can be found in the work of scholars such as 
Jared Diamond (1997; see also 2005) and climate historians who have argued for the 
sovereignty of climate in determining the fates of human societies (e.g. Fagan 1999). 
More common is the approach that assumes human sovereignty over the environment; 
this is associated with a trope whereby history describes a “conquest of nature.” Again, 
this idea has a deep pedigree in nineteenth-century historiography.  
3 Blackbourn (2006).  
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only agent in creating change, the field assumes that change emerges from a complex 
relationship between humans and something else, in this case the environment. But what, 
exactly, is “the environment”? We can, in a narrow sense, think of the environment as 
nature, in the form of water, climate, sources of energy, and disease. Yet it does not 
violate the architecture of a dialectical approach to treat something other than nature as 
the partner in the relationship. By way of example, it has become possible to argue that 
human society and sociability have constituted an important niche in which humanity 
itself has evolved. This argument has been developed most fully in the literature on the 
social intelligence hypothesis, which suggests that the human brain developed its 
qualities not simply in response to nature (e.g. the dangers of predation; the difficulty of 
the hunt; the challenge of living in the highly changeable climate of the Pleistocene) but 
also in response to other humans.
4 To navigate the complex world of human sociability, 
early hominins had to learn how to read and infer the intentions of others so as to build 
support groups or coalitions.
5 The argument also pertains to the modern world of the last 
five or ten thousand years, where we continue to respond to a constantly changing social 
niche through adaptations that are cultural in nature or take the form of changes in 
physical and psychological phenotypes, e.g. through epigenetic or developmental down-
regulation of testosterone.
6 
Given the fact that the “environment” in environmental history does not have to 
consist of nature, it takes just a small leap of the imagination to treat our own nervous 
system as an ecological niche in which the patterns of human culture have emerged and 
evolved. At first blush, this sounds like a very peculiar thing to say. In the self-and-other 
relationship that is essential to any dialectical process, isn’t the human nervous system on 
the “us” side? But it is not hard to come by simple examples illustrating how a quality of 
the nervous system helps explain some feature of human culture. Most historical 
societies, for example, have found ways to incorporate psychoactive substances—
alcohol, qat, opium, marijuana, coca, peyote, and so on—into their rituals or their 
marketplaces. By virtue of their ability to stimulate or alter the production of 
                                                 
4 Byrne and Whiten (1988); Goleman (2006). 
5 Dunbar (1996); Hrdy (2004, 2009). 
6 See Wrangham (1996); Larsen (1999); Cochran and Harpending (2009).  
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neurotransmitters such as dopamine or serotonin, these substances help create distinctive 
cultural forms, such as the religious trance, that would not otherwise exist in the quite the 
same way.
7 Neural pathways also help explain why pets are cute and why music has a 
beat, among many other things. The point that must be borne in mind here is that the 
science of the nervous system cannot explain the hows and whys of historical patterns. It 
cannot explain why, for example, the United States has criminalized marijuana, cocaine, 
and other drugs, but has not criminalized nicotine, alcohol, or for that matter other 
addictive practices like Facebook and shopping.
8 That is a matter for history to 
determine, not neuroscience. The nervous system is an ecological niche in which patterns 
or practices can evolve, but the niche does not insist that those patterns must evolve, nor 
does it guarantee that patterns will endure once they have evolved. 
This is the architecture of a neurohistorical approach to the past. It is an 
architecture of explanation that abandons the idea of a “transfer of sovereignty” from 
nature to culture that is so dominant in history, the humanities, and some of the social 
sciences like cultural anthropology. It offers instead a model where the nervous system 
itself is involved in a complex, never-ending dialectic with the cultural formations of the 
human past.  
In the first section of this paper, I seek to elaborate on this model by exploring 
some of the evolutionary principles that help explain how it works, including the 
principle of coevolution and the idea of a niche. A key feature of the model is that it does 
not treat the nervous system of any individual as hard-wired or genetically determined. 
Virtually no one in the neurosciences these days understands the brain-body system in the 
simple manner once proposed by pop sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. Part of 
the reason for this lies in the failure of the human genome project to find a one-to-one 
relationship between genes and phenotypic traits, at least where behavioral patterns are 
concerned. This, it turns out, was an immensely productive failure. Gene expression is far 
more complicated and far more interesting than once imagined, in part because it is 
subject to developmental and epigenetic influences.
9 The point here is that a 
                                                 
7 Whitehouse and Martin (2004). 
8 Herlinghaus (2010). 
9 Francis (2011); Carey (2012); see Kenneally (2011).  
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neurohistorical model assumes that the nervous system, consisting of synapses and 
receptors, is like any ecosystem: it can be shaped by the organisms that inhabit it. In 
practical terms, this means that individual or cultural circumstances help determine 
features of the practical architecture of the nervous system itself.
10 Translated into 
history, this means that in the same way that there is a continuous dialectic of influence 
between humans and their natural environment, so too is there a dialectic of influence 
between humans and their own nervous systems. 
Abstract reasoning, all too often, is an obstacle to understanding. For this reason, I 
seek to develop in the second part of this essay a case study based on the neurobiology of 
stress, which draws on some of my own work on the patterns of violence in later 
medieval Europe. Like most neurobiological states, stress is not something we can 
explore directly via the historical record: we cannot test the saliva or urine of historical 
actors for the presence of stress hormones, nor can we measure the activity of stress 
receptors in the hippocampus. This is not even remotely a problem for the practice of 
history. No historian ever assumes that facts emerge in a simple and uncomplicated way 
from the record of the past. Historical epistemology is necessarily inferential and 
inductive; it proceeds by way of strategic comparison and plausible supposition. At their 
best, historical arguments are based on a consilience of observations drawn from 
independent bodies of evidence. Historical claims are never assumed to be true; instead, 
corroborating research allows claims to grow ever more robust and plausible. Thus, 
although we cannot “see” stress hormones in the historical record, we can plausibly infer 
the presence of stress in situations involving violence, humiliation, and poverty. Stress is 
interesting as a historical subject because it allows us to write a human history framed in 
the context of an ongoing dialectic between the stress-response system on the one hand 
and human institutions, practices, and patterns of behavior on the other.  
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
10 Neural Darwinism has proposed an elegant explanation for how synapses and receptors 
are formed by focusing not on synaptic growth but instead on synaptic death. The infant 
brain has many trillions of neurons and potential synapses, but these will decay if not 
exercised. See Edelman 1987.  
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The dialectical pattern characteristic of environmental history is not unique to that field, 
for the philosophy of dialectical systems has a deep pedigree within the philosophy of 
history as theorized by Hegel and Marx. The work of Hegel, who did so much both to 
clarify and to obfuscate the practice of history, is of special relevance here, in part 
because of the paradoxes it generates. On the one hand, the Hegelian philosophy of 
history was instrumental in dividing the realm of biology from the realm of history.
11 
Biology, to Hegel, could not describe a historical process of change; it described instead 
the never-ending cycle of daily existence, revolving around birth, death, and the search 
for food. History, in the Hegelian view, described a non-cyclical or directional pattern of 
time, in which the presence of a political order, the State, offered humanity a release from 
the sterile cycling of the biological condition. The State allowed humans to transcend 
nature by softening and taming it. The memory of the past, that is to say historiography, 
created the possibility of a moral system, since the desire to be remembered well by the 
historians of the future encouraged rulers to be beneficent.  
The idea that history was founded on a break with nature cast a very long shadow 
over the practice of history. In the wake of the Darwinian revolution, this break took on 
special significance. If humans were once animals, after all, they must have once lived in 
a biological and therefore historyless condition. “The beast lives ahistorically,” wrote 
Nietzsche, thereby putting his finger on the very nub of the paradox of deep human 
time—for if humans were beasts and lived without history, where did history come 
from?
12 And when did it start? By the 1930s, the answer to this conundrum had become 
clear: history sprang into being during the Neolithic revolution, when some humans, by 
virtue of the invention of agriculture, civilization, and writing, escaped the grip of nature 
and embarked upon a new path, the path that Hegel, a century earlier, had described as 
the path of the State. If this story has a familiar ring to it, that is because it is simply the 
secular transposition of a story long told by Judeo-Christian sacred history, where history 
began with the expulsion from Eden.  
Hegel, like Leopold von Ranke, Henry Sumner Maine, and Oswald Spengler after 
him, was partly responsible for the belief that human history can be divided into a 
                                                 
11 Trautmann et al. (2011, 160) 
12 Nietzsche (1957 [1874]), p. 1.  
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historyless period and a period of history. This school of historical philosophy did not 
simply project historylessness onto the deep past of human existence. To the European 
observers of the nineteenth century, historylessness seemed to be all around them, not 
just in the so-called primitive tribes but also in great civilizations like China that, to 
Europeans, never seemed to be going anywhere. Only Europe, in European 
historiography of the nineteenth century, was pregnant with historicity.  
The paradoxical feature of Hegel is this: not only did he help create the original 
break in the fabric of history, he also conceived of a philosophy of historical change that 
now makes it possible to transcend that break. Historical change, to Hegel, is a dialectical 
process. Absent in nature (or so he thought), the dialectical pattern becomes activated by 
the presence of the State, and its presence explains the directionality and ceaseless change 
that marks historical societies. In Hegel’s day, of course, Charles Darwin and A.R. 
Wallace had not yet published their theory of natural selection. Writing when he did, 
Hegel could not know that natural history, like human history, is thick with dialectics. 
This is the pattern we now call Darwinian evolution.  
As a biological concept, Hegelian dialectics maps well onto a process that some 
biologists call coevolution. The idea of coevolution is that organisms do not evolve in 
response to a hard and unyielding set of selection pressures. Instead, there is always some 
sort of dialogue between an organism and its environment. In Hegel’s philosophical 
vocabulary, this was the dialogue between a thesis and its antithesis, but that is just an 
abstract way of describing the dialogue between an organism and another organism, an 
organism and its niche, and even between an organism and its own genes.  
Coevolutionary patterns share some unusual or interesting features. Some 
herbivores, for example, can get locked into spiraling relationships with the plants on 
which they feed, for as plants gain toxins to avoid being eaten, the animal or insect 
develops the capacity to metabolize those toxins. The competitive one-upping of these 
coevolutionary relationships describes well how the dyad can go haring off in wild 
directions. Relative to each other, for example, the cheetah, like its ancestors, has always 
been just a tiny bit faster than the gazelle or the pronghorn and their ancestors. That ratio, 
arguably, has not changed over the long evolutionary relationship between the species 
involved. But even though cheetahs and gazelles stand still in their relationship to one  
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another, both species have become spectacularly swift relative to other animals. In his 
path-breaking 1973 article, Leigh van Valen described this as the “Red Queen” 
hypothesis, where Alice and the Red Queen dance furiously but never go anywhere.
13 
Following a different metaphor, Richard Dawkins and J.R. Krebs described these 
evolutionary processes as a kind of “arms race,” where an arms build-up by one party 
entails a similar build-up by the opponent.
14 Where historical explanation is concerned, 
what is significant about the evolutionary arms-race is the way in which it describes a 
trend that seems to spiral off in wild new directions. This is apt description for how 
historians have understood the dramatic patterns of historical change in the wake of 
revolutions like the Neolithic Revolution, the Scientific Revolution, the French 
Revolution, and so on.  
Coevolutionary relationships do not have to be antagonistic arms-races. Where 
human history is concerned, perhaps the most obvious example is offered by the 
agricultural transition starting some 10,000 years ago. It used to be thought that humans 
domesticated plants and animals, turning them to do their bidding and creating new 
breeds or strains in the process. Agriculture, however, is now understood as a process of 
mutual domestication, with all parties concerned acting as equal partners in a relationship 
that changed humans just as much as it changed plants and animals.
15  
Recently, the principle of coevolution has been extended to the niche itself, 
though in a sense this was always understood to be the case.
16 Organisms are adapted to 
exploit not the entirety of an ecosystem but instead one particular corner, that is to say a 
niche. Thus, the genus Homo was adapted to exploit a foraging, scavenging, and hunting 
niche that came into being in the savannahs of East Africa with the onset of the drier 
conditions of the early Pleistocene around 2.6 million years ago. Niches have a number of 
interesting properties. Among them is the fact that there are only a limited number of 
solutions to the challenges inherent in exploiting a given niche. This constraint is what 
lies behind the principle of convergence, namely, the pattern whereby the phenotypes of 
                                                 
13 Van Valen (1973); Ridley (1995). 
14 Dawkins and Krebs (1979). 
15 E.g. Pollan (2001). 
16 Odling-Smee et al. (2003).  
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plants and animals that inhabit similar niches can converge toward similar solutions.
17 
Convergence explains why both the placental and marsupial lineages produced a saber-
toothed cat with teeth designed to kill large prey through puncture wounds that cause 
them to bleed to death, and why the niche occupied by small mammalian insectivores, as 
found in both Madagascar and England, has produced two animals, the tenrec and the 
hedgehog, that are nearly identical in body plan and behavior despite being separated by 
tens of millions of years of evolutionary time. 
Older models of Darwinian evolution imagined that organisms typically follow a 
step behind changes in their ecological niches. Thus, human evolution followed the 
pattern of climate change that made the East African savannahs. In a vivid recent 
example, elephants in certain parts of Africa are now increasingly likely to be born 
without tusks, a trait that probably developed in response to predation by human ivory 
hunters. The principle of niche construction, however, suggests that organisms do not 
simply lie passively within their niche. Instead, to greater or lesser degrees, they are 
continuously engaged in constructing their own niche. In her study of sheep-raising in 
colonial Mexico, the environmental historian Eleanor Melville described a process 
whereby the action of millions of tiny hoofs over a period of decades gradually 
compacted the soil and removed texture, thus discouraging water retention and 
fundamentally changing an agrarian landscape to a landscape consisting of an eroded 
scrubland suitable only for pasture.
18 In the same way that there is a coevolutionary 
dialogue between two organisms, so too is there a dialogue between an organism and its 
niche. This is, in fact, the best way to think about the Neolithic transition: as humans 
founds ways to extract calories, power, fibers, and a range of secondary products from 
the plants and animals in their environment, they transformed the niche they occupied, 
but at the same time were transformed in response to the new niche.  
In his seminal study, William Durham argued that genes and culture can get 
tangled up in a coevolutionary relationship.
19 The habit of drinking fresh milk in a few 
early pastoral societies, to take the best known example, created a selection pressure that 
                                                 
17 Conway Morris (2003); Dawkins (2004); Vermeij (2006). 
18 Melville (1994). 
19 Durham (1991).  
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favored the retention into adulthood of the ability to digest milk sugar. As the necessary 
alleles spread in central Europe, Africa, and perhaps other milk-drinking areas, dietary 
patterns were changed. Selection pressures generated by cultural changes, in other words, 
can be felt in the genome, even over relatively short spans of time. Much the same pattern 
works for features of the brain and the nervous system, though in this case we are not 
necessarily dealing with genetic changes. The genotype builds neurons and neurons 
create synapses, and thus the basic architecture of the systems like the stress-response 
system and the reward system are sketched out by the genome. But epigenetic patterns 
and developmental experiences determine how these systems actually work in practice by 
creating, maintaining, and in some cases destroying receptors and synapses.  
The epigenetic revolution allows us to abandon the idea that in the relationship 
between culture and the brain, one of the two must be sovereign. Pop sociobiology and 
certain fields of evolutionary psychology have insisted that cognitive modules, designed 
by natural selection, are sovereign in their ability to define behavioral traits. 
Anthropology and history, in contrast, have insisted that culture is sovereign. Yet despite 
the illusion of antagonism, these two stances are two halves of the same coin. They share 
the Hegelian supposition that biology and culture can be placed in an imaginary historical 
timeline where biology was in the past and culture in the present. Evolutionary 
psychologists and culturalists differ only on the issue of whether behavioral sovereignty 
has been handed off from biology to culture. The insights of epigenetics allow us to 
transcend this utterly sterile debate by treating the nervous system and culture as equal 
partners in an ongoing and never-ending coevolutionary relationship.  
 
* * * * * 
 
To explore how this dialectical model might work in practice, let us consider the 
neurobiology of stress. As Robert Sapolsky, the leading figure in the study of stress, has 
pointed out, stress is good for you in limited doses.
20 It primes the system to respond 
quickly and efficiently to temporary or sudden challenges. Stress generates a number of 
                                                 
20 Sapolsky (2004).  
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adaptive responses in the body, ranging from dilated eyes and elevated heart rate to loss 
of appetite and sexual desire.  
Chronic stress, by contrast, is clearly bad for you, and the effects of a chronic 
stress can begin to erode the ability of the nervous system to handle stress. For this 
reason, stress works well as a social or political tool. Among certain baboons, for 
example, dominant females systematically terrorize their subordinates to ensure 
unfettered access to resources, and one of the effects of stress is that the fertility of lower-
ranking females is reduced or diverted toward the production of male offspring who will 
not compete with the offspring of dominant females. Stress, in other words, is a 
neurobiological correlate of social rank or position. The experience of stress also 
implicates the reward system. Consider, in this vein, an experiment involving mice, an 
animal that shares the stress-response system common to all mammals.
21 If a mouse is 
handicapped in such a way as to be the loser in a series of fights with other mice, it enters 
a condition of stress marked by chronically high levels of stress hormones. The mouse 
loses initiative and becomes listless and compliant.
22 Mice who suffer repeated social 
defeat begin to self-medicate themselves with cocaine, a dopamine agonist, at a higher 
rate than other mice. Stress, finally, is heritable in an oddly Lamarckian way that has 
considerable implications for history. Experiments with rats conducted by Michael 
Meaney and his associates have shown than the maternal licking of pups leads to a 
greater density of stress receptors in the hippocampus, which in turn allows the young 
rats to handle stress more easily.
23 If rat pups are not licked, their ability to handle stress 
is reduced; what is more, female rats who were not cared for as pups are less likely to lick 
their own offspring, leading to several generations in which a situation similar to chronic 
stress is transmitted epigenetically from mother to offspring. 
As this rapid survey suggests, the stress-response system is one of many 
candidates for the dialectical model of neurohistory sketched out above. Because chronic 
stress can have social or political consequences, it is easy to imagine that human 
behavioral patterns have evolved, albeit unconsciously, in ways that allow powerful or 
                                                 
21 Yap and Miczek (2007); see Zimmer (2010). 
22 Snyder et al., (2011). 
23 Liu et al. (1997).  
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dominant individuals or institutions to exploit the latent quality of chronic stress. The 
stress-response system, in other words, acts as a niche in which human patterns and 
institutions take shape. At the same time, the stress-response system has a significant 
degree of plasticity—not in its structure, but in the way in which it works in given 
individuals. That plasticity can produce a pattern whereby stress can be an inherited 
feature of certain class or status groups, which may help explain a pattern that figures like 
Marx and Gramsci sought to explain through ideas such as false consciousness and 
hegemony. Chronic stress cannot explain why peasants and workers (let alone the 
participants in the Arab Spring) have, on occasion, chosen to rebel against the systems 
that have oppressed them, but it might help explain why they have done so less often than 
the conditions of their abuse would have suggested. In the example of the mice that 
experience social defeat, note that the self-medication with a dopamine agonist, although 
seen as a symptom of defeat by the scientists who have conducted the studies, could just 
as well be seen as a symptom of resistance.  
Let me now bring the neurobiology of stress to bear on patterns of violence in 
Europe during the later middle ages, the period that is the subject of much of my own 
research. Violence is interesting in part because violence can be stressful to the victims; 
arguably, this is one of the reasons that violence has proven to be so adaptive for humans, 
other primates, and other animals. Violence as a stress-delivery system works well if it 
inflicts non-lethal and humiliating violence on the bodies of others, or if it acts in a 
context of publicity that allows the message to be conveyed to a wider audience. Far from 
being irrational, in other words, violence is adaptive by virtue of the stress it induces. 
Surveying the primatological literature, for example, Randolph Roth has pointed out that 
the chronic stress to which lower-ranking male chimpanzees are often subjected lowers 
their testosterone level and discourages them from challenging the position of higher-
ranking chimpanzees.
24 
In the records from later medieval Europe, violence can take many different 
forms. One omnipresent form is the violence inflicted by one person on another. Some of 
this violence shows up in contests sparked by a sense of honor or justice; such fights 
often lead to bloodshed, insults, and threats. Other violent behaviors include spousal 
                                                 
24 Roth (2011).  
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abuse, child-beating, or the abuse of servants and slaves. A second type is the violence 
that sovereign bodies, including lords, kings, and city-states, chose to inflict upon their 
subjects. This violence takes the form of public spectacles, such as humiliating 
punishments and public executions arising from crime, treason, witchcraft, and the like. 
Even more common if less spectacular are spectacles of private debt recovery supervised 
by the courts of law; these spectacles sometimes involved shaming rituals and also 
countless acts of highly publicized and potentially violent seizures of goods from the 
households of debtors.
25  
Relatively uncommon before 1250 or 1300, state-on-subject violence begins to 
accelerate in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and remains a significant feature of 
the European scene until the eighteenth century and beyond, when the flow of violence 
and stress in European states starts to take on new qualities. We can write this history in a 
conventional Weberian way. That is to say, we can argue that newly emerging states were 
seeking to develop a monopoly on the exercise of coercive force, and sought to 
criminalize illicit forms of person-on-person violence in the process. Violence, according 
to this argument, is permitted only in contexts like sports, where it is sanctioned by the 
state.
26 The history of violence has long been plotted as a history of declining rates of 
homicide and everyday acts of aggression, where the state and the civil or courtly 
institutions that it fosters play a major role in the “civilizing” of a violent instinct. This 
argument tends to assume that violence is a feature of humanity’s evolved psychology. In 
the recent work of Steven Pinker, for example, violence, like a continental plate in a 
subduction zone, has largely disappeared underneath the weight of the Leviathan and the 
emergence of reason or self-control.
27 Like volcanoes or hot water springs, it might 
occasionally punch through the weight of the plate that lies atop it, but otherwise person-
on-person violence has been largely repressed. 
There is a lot to be said for this model, since it provides a relatively parsimonious 
explanation for what appears to have been a general per capita decline in death by 
violence in Western Europe and the United States. It certainly conforms to a folk reason 
                                                 
25 Smail (2012). 
26 Elias and Dunning (1986). 
27 Pinker (2011).  
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according to which people in the largely ungoverned Middle Ages were violent and grew 
progressively less violent over the ensuing centuries. Once we look at violence using 
some of the perspectives of neuroscience, however, things begin to look a little different.  
To begin with, let us consider the nature of testosterone. The history of violence 
has assumed a steady supply of testosterone. But supposing testosterone itself has been 
down-regulated in societies that have less violence? This is at least theoretically possible. 
Roth has already pointed out that stress might play a role in this, since stress can lead to 
the down-regulation of testosterone production in socially subordinate chimpanzees.
28 
Another study has shown that testosterone production is typically down-regulated in 
human males who engage in three or more hours of care-giving per day.
29 This process, 
which is described in the study as a life-cycle issue, is also a historical or cultural one, 
since the down-regulation of testosterone does not happen automatically with fatherhood. 
It depends, instead, on the prior existence of a family and work environment that allows 
or promotes regular contact with infants. The genotype certainly defines the parameters 
of testosterone production, and it may define a probability spectrum in the testosterone 
phenotype of any given male, but the actual phenotype is determined in large part by 
developmental or epigenetic circumstances and by cultural patterns. To put this 
differently, it is uninteresting to say that males are predisposed to violence if the 
neurobiological hardware for violence is shaped to a large degree by cultural or historical 
circumstances.  
What this emerging literature suggests is that we ought to look for the decline of 
violence not just in the rise of state-level policing and crime control but also in other 
institutional factors, including patterns of chronic stress or social defeat and, perhaps 
more positively, in transformations in family forms and work patterns that have 
encouraged greater paternal care-giving. Other potential factors may well come to light, 
and we can look to see whether they have any historical correlates.  
How, then, might we reinterpret the history of violence in later medieval and early 
modern Europe through the perspectives of the neurobiology of stress? As noted above, 
we have a strong inclination to contrast person-on-person violence with state-on-person 
                                                 
28 Roth (2011). 
29 Gettler et al. (2011)  
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violence, and to assume that the latter emerged only for the purpose of restraining the 
former. But we can think of this process without the assumption that states are 
benevolent. In light of the neurobiology of stress, it is possible to think of states as 
organizations that have an interest in controlling the circulation of stress in society. States 
criminalized illicit violence, in this view, not for the stated purposes of preventing the 
sinful or uncivil shedding of blood, but instead to develop a monopoly on the production 
and distribution of stress in European society. Person-on-person violence, in this model, 
was interpreted by the new authority figures as an illicit “stress transaction” that needed 
to be repressed or taxed via criminal fines. These stress transactions, in other words, were 
not criminalized because states had an interest in eliminating violence and stress. Far 
from it: this is exactly the period during which states were perfecting their own systems 
for delivering stress, in the form of pillories, shaming rituals, public spectacles, and, as I 
have argued elsewhere, the institutional shaming and humiliation of debtors.
30 Where 
debt is concerned, the stress transaction still involves two individuals, a creditor and a 
debtor, but state sovereignty arises from the fact that the transaction necessarily flowed 
through the civil courts, a medium controlled by the state. The state profited monetarily 
from the transaction, and also benefited from the monopoly it was developing on the flow 
of stress in human societies.  
Writing about the dialectical process, Hegel supposed that every thesis generated 
its own antithesis. In this case, it is possible to imagine the antithesis to an emerging state 
desire to develop a monopoly on the circulation of stress in European society. In our 
analyses of violence, we tend to sympathize with the victims, and lose sight of the fact 
that violence is a major element of the tournament of prestige where the humiliations 
inflicted on the losers are counter-balanced by the pleasures and satisfactions experienced 
by the winners. State-level restrictions on person-on-person violence motivated by 
concerns for honor and justice, thus, arguably reduced a significant source of pleasure 
and self-satisfaction. In this light, one of the most striking features of early modern and 
modern Europe has been the development of a significant array of new dopamine 
agonists, ranging from psychopharmacological substances to cultural practices such as 
theater, music, and consumption. Modern global capitalism, in a sense, can be seen as an 
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enormous dopamine-delivery system. It may be plausible to suggest that when state-level 
restrictions reduced the prevalence of violence-based tournaments of prestige, citizen-
subjects found new sources of reward, and shifted their tournaments of prestige into the 
realm of competitive consumption and taste. 
This, of course, is a vague and insubstantial set of arguments. The value of this 
sketch, if any, lies in its potential to suggest new research questions. Rather than a vision 
based on the civilization of manners and the decline of violence, this neurohistorical 
perspective suggests a transformation in the ways in which prestige and stress were and 
are transacted in European societies. Historians, in general, like to generate grand 
narrative structures, such as “the birth of Western Civilization,” “the rise of the state,” 
“the creation of patriarchy,” or “the decline of violence.” These narratives are neither true 
nor false; they are useful only because they help to organize historical work. With any 
given narrative, you are either for it or against it, and that choice determines how you, as 
a historian, approach your teaching and your research. The complex history of stress, 
when viewed from a deep historical perspective, is at least as interesting as any of the 
usual narratives. Like any deep historical narrative (and unlike conventional historical 
narratives), the dialectical history of stress does not have a beginning or an end. Put 
differently, it is not a history defined by the telos—civilization; the state; the patriarchal 
condition; a peaceful utopia—toward which it is heading. In 1984, George Orwell hinted 
at just such a telos, where history ends with a system of government that has perfected a 
pattern of governance based on the exploitation of the stress-response system.
31 Perhaps 
it is too optimistic to say that this cannot happen, but for now, we can proceed from the 
assumption that the future is probably not so grim. 
                                                 
31 Orwell (1949).  
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